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This paper discusses the limitations of the price-income ratio, the
price-rent ratio, and of a⁄ordability measures as indicators of housing
market conditions. For the purpose of assessing whether house prices
are misaligned, the most sensible approach is to calculate the user
cost of ownership and the implied theoretical ratio of house prices to
rents, and compare the latter with the observed ratio. On the basis
of this methodology, US house prices appear to have departed from
fundamentals since 2004, cumulating an overvaluation of between 25
and 30 per cent by the third quarter of 2006.
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11 Introduction
During the last decade, house prices in the United States and in a number
of other industrial countries have recorded unusually large increases, both
in nominal and real terms. A recent OECD study notes that the duration of
the current expansionary phase and its correlation across countries are both
unprecedented and that recently, contrary to past experience, the behaviour
of house prices appears to have disconnected from the business cycle.1 Those
facts pose a series of questions that are of interest for policy-making pur-
poses. What are the factors underlying the observed acceleration of house
prices? Are house prices in line with fundamentals, or have they moved
apart somewhat from their economic determinants? How has the recent
house price boom a⁄ected macroeconomic conditions, and how would the
latter change in the event of a reduction ￿ or even just a sharp decelera-
tion ￿ in house prices? How likely is such a correction? These questions
are certainly related to each other. Assessing the likelihood of a down-
turn entails ￿rst establishing the fundamental determinants of house price
dynamics and, thus, quantifying the extent of misalignment, if any. The
macroeconomic implications of changes in house prices and housing wealth,
especially with respect to aggregate consumption, could depend largely on
whether those changes are perceived to be permanent or transitory. There-
fore, any assessment of the sustainability of house prices must start from
a recognition of their underlying determinants; the extent of misalignment
can then be measured on the basis of some associated metrics. In addi-
tion to long-run demand and supply side determinants, such as trends in
demographics and construction costs, and emerging restrictions on the use
of land for the development of new properties, house prices are related to
nominal and/or real interest rates, household incomes, and rents. The latter
set of variables capture short as well as long-run house price dynamics and
￿ since deviations from equilibrium are inherently a short-run concept ￿
those fundamentals enter some commonly used measures of house price sus-
tainability or a⁄ordability, including the price-income ratio, the price-rent
ratio, the a⁄ordability index, and the user cost of ownership.
The aim of this paper is two-fold. The ￿rst is to discuss the information
content of those measures, drawing on the existing literature. The most
sensible approach is to calculate the user cost and the implied ratio of house
prices to rents, and compare the latter with the observed ratio. Throughout
the discussion, I elaborate on the meaning of commonly used a⁄ordability
indexes, stressing how their interpretation as indicators of housing market
conditions is not independent of one crucial feature of the economy, namely
the presence of a sizeable fraction of households facing credit constraints.
1The rapid growth in house prices has occurred despite the slowdown in the OECD
business cycle. See Girouard et al. (2006).
2The second goal of the paper is to assess recent developments in the US
housing market and infer whether they have moved in line with fundamen-
tals. Calculations of the user cost, to be viewed with caution for reasons that
are discussed in the paper, indicate that during the recent boom US house
prices moved along an equilibrium path until the end of 2003, but diverged
from fundamentals thereafter, accumulating an overvaluation of almost 30
per cent by the third quarter of 2006.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section brie￿ y describes the
evolution of house prices and its main determinants (incomes, interest rates,
and rents) in the Unites States over the last 30 years; Section 3 reviews
and calculates (for the US) the house price-income ratio (3.1) and price-rent
ratio (3.2), the a⁄ordability index (3.3), and the user cost of capital (3.4).
Section 4 concludes.
2 House prices and their determinants in the US
Between 1975 and the third quarter of 2006 real house prices in the United
States doubled (Figure 1). Between 1975 and 1995 they rose by a cumulative
18 per cent, exhibiting two complete cycles: they rose by 15 per cent in
1975-79, fell by 9 per cent between 1979 and 1983, increased by 18 per cent
between 1984 and 1989, and fell by 7 per cent in 1990-95. Since 1996, they
have increased by almost 70 per cent, reaching a level almost 70 per cent
above their previous (1989) historical peak.
The growth of real per capita personal disposable income between 1975
and 2006 has been much smoother. Real house prices have historically be-
haved procyclically, somewhat lagging business cycle developments (Figure
2); this empirical regularity, however, appears to have broken towards the
end of the latest cycle, a fact highlighted for the US and other OECD coun-
tries by Girouard et al. (2006); since the 2001 recession, the deceleration
of disposable income has been accompanied by a sharp acceleration of real
house prices.
Among the potential determinants of house prices are also the levels of
nominal and real interest rates (Figure 3). Nominal mortgage rates increased
dramatically between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s,
from about 9 to 18 per cent, re￿ ecting the increase in actual and expected
in￿ ation and the subsequent monetary restriction operated by the Federal
Reserve. Since 1982 they have declined, to a historical low of 5:5 per cent
at the beginning of 2003; thereafter, they have increased somewhat, but
remained at historically low levels. The rise and subsequent fall in real
3Figure 1. Real house prices and per-capita disposable income (1)












































































































































House prices Disposable income
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve, and Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Organization (OFHEO).  (1) OFHEO house price
index and nominal per capita personal disposable income deflated by the total consumption deflator.
Figure 2. Variations in real house prices and per-capita disposable income (1)











































































































































House prices Disposable income
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve, and Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Organization (OFHEO).  (1) OFHEO house price
index and nominal per capita personal disposable income deflated by the total consumption deflator.















































































































































Mortgage (real, naive) Mortgage (real, Livingston) Mortgage (nominal), right scale
Source: calculations on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve. (1) Naive inflation expectations are defined as the current
quarter rate of inflation over 1 year earlier; survey 10-year inflation expectations are taken from the Livingston Survey (Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia).
interest rates have also been very pronounced, although less than in nominal
terms. In particular, real rates calculated on the basis of survey in￿ ation
expectations declined from 10 per cent in 1982 to 3 per cent at the beginning
of 2003.2 The concurrent fall in actual and expected in￿ ation accounts
for the convergence of nominal to real interest rates. The recent boom
in house prices could be partly explained by falling rates in recent years;
analogously, the dramatic rise in interest rates could partly account for the
housing market weakness in the ￿rst half of the 1980s.
The trend increase in US real house prices over the last 30 years may to
some extent re￿ ect the structural changes that have occurred in the mort-
gage market, making it increasingly easy for households to access housing
￿nance.3 Since 1983 the ratio of mortgage debt to disposable income has
more than doubled, from 42 per cent in to 96 per cent (Figure 4).4 The view
that the evolution of credit market conditions may have been an important
determinant of housing market developments is reinforced by evidence of
2CPI in￿ ation expectations 10 years ahead are obtained from the Livingston Survey of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
3For a thorough discussion of how institutional reforms have transformed the US mort-
gage market since the Great Depression, see Green and Wachter (2005).
4In a recent study, Campbell and Hercovitz (2006) argue that major institutional re-
forms at the beginning of the 1980s, by easing credit constraints for US households, account
for much of the increase in household indebtedness over the last 25 years.
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Debt/Income (1) Real house prices
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve. (1) Percentage values; the denominator is the value of disposable income for the year
ending in the reference quarter. - (2) The house price index is normalized so that its value in 1980Q1 coincides with the debt-income ratio.
the correlation between real house prices and the debt-income ratio. It is
worth noting that thanks to an equally rapid increase in households￿￿nan-
cial and real assets, the rise in the ratio of debt to total assets, a measure of
leverage, has been much less pronounced than that of the debt-income ratio;
also, thanks to declining nominal interest rates, the ratio of debt service to
disposable income has remained within a fairly limited range (Figure 5).
Market rents are an important theoretical determinant of tenure choice,
and should therefore concur to determine, in general equilibrium, the level
of house prices. This is true especially in the long run, when one should
expect market forces to prevent house prices diverging from market rents.
In the short run, however, persistent deviations are possible due to the
illiquid and segmented nature of the housing market. Figure 6 shows the
evolution of the rent component of the CPI, "de￿ ated" with the consumption
expenditure price index;5 average rents have tended to increase faster than
overall consumer prices, but slower than per capita disposable income. The
latter does not imply that the aggregate value of housing consumption (the
services provided by housing) has declined relative to income, since the
service ￿ ow of housing depends on both mean rents and the quantity of
housing; rather, the ratio of housing consumption to disposable income has
5The series for the rent index, available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, starts in
1983.
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Source: Federal Reserve. (1) Ratio of interest and minimum contracted principal payments and disposable income.
￿ uctuated within a fairly narrow range, exhibiting a trend ￿ if any ￿ that
over has been positive the last 30 years (Figure 7). It should be noted,
however, that total consumption has also increased as a fraction of income;
the ratio of housing to total consumption, instead, has been rather stable
(possibly with the exception of the 1950s) with no evidence of a trend in the
last few decades.
3 Measuring house price misalignment
In this section I review and discuss some commonly used metrics for the
assessment of house price misalignments, i.e. the price-income ratio, the
price-rent ratio, the a⁄ordability index, and the user cost of capital, showing
for each of them calculations for the United States over the longest available
sample. Note that in all cases I only provide an index of the ratio, since the
dollar levels of house prices and rents are not available. This implies that
house prices can only be assessed by comparing any measure with its own
historical average. Results should therefore be viewed with caution, espe-
cially considering that the indicators are available for relatively short periods
of time, starting in 1975 at the earliest. The core message of this section
is that the price-income and price-rent ratios, as well as the a⁄ordability
index, are not appropriate metrics to infer misalignments. Economically,
7Figure 6. Real rents and rent-income ratio












































































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Federal Reserve





















































































































Housing consumption to disposable income Housing to total consumption
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve.
8Figure 8. Ratio between house prices and per capita disposable income










































































































































Source: calculations on data from Federal Reserve and Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Organization.
the most sensible way to pursue this goal is to calculate the annual cost of
ownership, and to compare it to market rents. Measures of the user cost for
the United States suggest that in the second half of 2006 house prices were
overvalued by about 30 per cent.
3.1 Price-income ratio
One of the measures commonly used to assess whether house prices are "too
high" is the ratio of average prices to average per capita income. A high
ratio should be taken as indication that the cost of buying a house is high
relative to households￿ability to pay or, alternatively, that purchasing a
house entails devoting a higher share of income. The assumption underlying
this approach is that in the long run, house prices and incomes share some
common trend.
Figure 8 shows the ratio of average house prices to per capita disposable
income for the United States, normalized by its 30-year average. During the
1980s and most of the 1990s the price-income ratio declined. The recent
acceleration of house prices has inverted the trend: in 2002 the price-income
ratio was back to its historical average, and by the second half of 2006 it had
increased to an historical high of 123. Proxying the equilibrium ratio with
the sample average would lead to the conclusion that in the third quarter of
2006 house prices were between 20 and 25 per cent "too high".
9With respect to the purpose of measuring house price misalignments,
the price-income ratio has the merit of linking house prices to an indicator
of the ability of households to issue and service debt. However, two major
drawbacks are that it in no way accounts for market rents, which measure
the value of housing services, and that it does not control for the level of
either nominal or real interest rates. A high ratio need not necessarily imply
a misalignment, but could be explained by relatively high market rents or
low interest rates. In particular, as will be shown in Section 3.3, a measure
of the burden of a house purchase ￿ i.e. the share of available resources a
household has to give up over its lifetime to purchase a house ￿ is given by
the price-income ratio multiplied by the ratio between current and average
expected future nominal mortgage interest rates.
3.2 Price-rent ratio
The easiest way to account for rents is to take the ratio of house prices to an
index of rents, which is akin to calculating the price-earnings ratio for stocks.
In a frictionless market, any price misalignment relative to rents should
be arbitraged away by households optimizing over their tenure choice. An
increase in the price-rent ratio could therefore be an indication that owning
has become less convenient compared with renting and should be followed
by a decrease.
Figure 9 reports the price-rent ratio for the United States over the 1983-
2006 period. Contrary to the price-income ratio, there was no declining
trend in the price-rent ratio over the 1980s and 1990s; rather, the latter
exhibited large swings, mostly re￿ ecting real house price movements, in-
creasing throughout the 1980s, reaching a peak in 1989, and subsequently
declining, smoothly, to a low in 1995 that was just 11 per cent below the
previous peak. Since the second half of the last decade, the ratio has in-
creased at an accelerating pace; the new peak reached in the third quarter
of 2006 was 55 per cent higher than the level in 1995, 40 per cent above the
historical average, and almost 30 per cent above a linear trend, which could
suggest a large misalignment.
While controlling for the value of housing services, the price-rent ratio,
taken at face value, still misses two important elements, namely the opportu-
nity cost of the housing investment (which for simplicity could be proxied by
the risk-free long-term interest rate), and the expected capital gain (house
appreciation). As in the standard Gordon formula for stocks, the equilib-
rium ratio of house prices to rents should be derived by equating the return
10Figure 9. Ratio of house prices to rents









































































































Source: calculations on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics and Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Organization.
on the housing investment to that on an alternative risk-free asset:6
Rt+1 + Et (Pt+1) ￿ Pt
Pt
= rrt+1 + ￿ (1)
where Rt is the real level of rents, Pt the real price of the house, rrt+1 the real
interest rate between t and t + 1, ￿ is a constant compensation for the risk
of holding real estate assets, and Et is the expectation operator conditional
on information available at time t. Solving (1) forward with respect to Pt





(1 + rrt+j + ￿)j (2)
which says that Pt should equal the expected present discounted value of
future rents. If the real interest rate was constant at rr and real rents grew





rr + ￿ ￿ g
. (3)
If real interest rates and the growth of real rents are not constant but are
at least stationary and not too erratic, then equation (3) provides a good
approximation of equation (2). In this case one may expect the price-rent
6See Weeken (2004).
11ratio to be stationary, and justify an assessment of house price misalign-
ments based on the comparison of the actual and the average ratio. If
instead the real interest rate is not stationary, or exhibits sizeable and per-
sistent deviations from its mean, as suggested by the experience of the last
thirty years, one should not expect the price-rent ratio to be approximately
constant. A correct procedure would therefore be to compare the price-rent
ratio not with its historical average, but with the value implied by (2), which
is explicitly accomplished by the user cost approach (Section 3.4).
3.3 A⁄ordability index
Broadly speaking, housing a⁄ordability refers to the "terms on which dwellings
can be purchased and loans to purchase can be amortized", and the rela-
tionship between those terms and households￿incomes.7 Rough-and-ready
indicators of a⁄ordability are obtained from some measure of the ability to
service the debt that is necessary to purchase it. Here, I consider the ratio
between a proxy for the interest service corresponding to the loan that is
necessary to purchase an average-priced house and average income.8 The
numerator, obtained by multiplying the ￿xed interest rate on conventional
mortgages (rm
t ) by the average house price (index, Pt), is thus divided by
the level of per capita disposable income (Yt). An increase in the index
indicates a fall in a⁄ordability, since the burden of payments required to
amortize the ￿xed-rate long-term mortgage needed to buy the representa-
tive (average-priced) house has increased relative to average income.9 In the
United States, a⁄ordability fell sharply towards the end of the 1970s follow-
ing the dramatic increase in nominal interest rates not being compensated
by higher incomes or lower house prices (Figure 10). Since the beginning of
the 1980s, falling nominal interest rates have driven a⁄ordability ￿rst back
7Quigley and Raphael (2004). The authors also note that for low-income and poor
households, who are priced out by the market for home-ownership, a⁄ordability should
instead be de￿ned as the terms for rental contracts, and the relation between those terms
and their incomes.
8The de￿nition of a⁄ordability adopted in this paper is slightly di⁄erent, somewhat
more simplistic than those adopted by US organizations such as the National Association
of Realtors (NAR) or the US Department for Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
which de￿ne a⁄ordability as the ratio between the median household income and the
income that quali￿es for a conventional mortgage on the average house sold; this takes
into account the constraints posed by the existence of requirements such as a maximum
loan-to-value ratio or a maximum ratio between amortization payments and income.
9One should bear in mind that the interest rate is not the only variable de￿ning the
terms of mortgage contracts. The latter usually also include a minimum required prepay-
ment and a term by which principal must be repaid, usually associated with a repayment
schedule. These conditions also a⁄ect a⁄ordability: higher prepayment requirements im-
ply that more equity must be built up in order to purchase a house. Longer mortgage
durations lower average per-period payments, and make ownership easier to access by
households for given income and house prices. Commonly used a⁄ordability indexes, in-
cluding the one discussed in this section, do not account for the features mentioned.
12Figure 10. Index of housing affordability and nominal mortgage interest rate


















































































































































Affordability index Interest rate (right scale)
Source: calculations on data from Federal Reserve and Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Organization. (1) The index is defined as the product of
the house price index and mortgage interest rate divided by per capita disposable income; an increase in the index means that housing is less
affordable.
to its initial level, then up to an historical high in 2003.
Note that the a⁄ordability index correlates at both the low- and the
high-frequency with the nominal interest rate, and that most of the latter￿ s
decline ￿ and the associated increase in a⁄ordability ￿ over the last 25
years took place in 1980-93 (Figure 10). During the recent house price
boom, the index ￿ oated around an already low level, although between 2000
and end-2002 the interest rate declined from 8:3 to an historical low of 5:5
per cent, broadly compensating higher house prices. Since the beginning of
2003 a⁄ordability has declined by about 25 per cent, following the continuing
rapid increase in house prices and the stability of nominal interest rates.
It is natural to ask what implications for house prices one should ex-
pect from changes in a⁄ordability. The reciprocal of the a⁄ordability index
corresponds to the (normalized) share of the average income that should be
devoted to service the interest bill on the mortgage necessary to buy the
average-priced house. I stress the conditionality of this claim since, without
credit constraints, nothing should prevent households from borrowing in or-
der to meet part or all of their current debt payments. Indeed, a household
possibly facing an upward sloping income path, after taking debt would op-
timally choose to devote more of its current income to consumption, and
postpone the amortization of debt to draw on future income ￿ ows. In gen-
eral, in such a world an increase in a⁄ordability stemming solely from a fall
13in nominal interest rates, for unchanged real rates, should not be expected
to a⁄ect housing demand and prices. In fact, an increase in nominal interest
rates that is exactly matched by in￿ ation results only in a tilting of the debt
service burden towards early periods of a lifetime, while releasing resources
in the more distant future. However, the share of the present value of lifetime
income ￿ ows that must be devoted to service debt remains unchanged. To
see this, assume for example that the reference contract is an interest-only
in￿nite time horizon mortgage, which is consistent with the adopted mea-
sure of a⁄ordability, whose numerator considers interest payments only.10
For simplicity, also assume that the house purchase is fully debt-￿nanced,
i.e. one has to raise funds for an amount equal to the current value of the
house (Pt), and that the mortgage contract features a ￿xed nominal interest
rate. These assumptions imply that over his/her lifetime, the prospective
debtor will incur a ￿xed annual nominal payment equal to the product be-
tween Pt and the mortgage interest rate at the time of the purchase. Using












where rt is the risk-free nominal interest rate, rm
t is the ￿xed mortgage in-
terest rate. Assuming that the nominal interest rate (rt) can be expressed
as the sum of the real growth rate of the economy (gt), in￿ ation (￿t), and a
risk premium (’t), i.e. (1 + rt) = (1 + gt)(1 + ￿t)(1 + ’t), the approxima-
tion in (4) holds if gt, ￿t, and ’t are approximately constant. Similarly, the









where Yt is income, ’ the in￿ ation risk premium, and the approximation
rests on the assumption made above about the nominal interest rate plus the
additional assumption that nominal income growth is given approximately
by (1 + g)(1 + ￿).
Thus, the ratio between present value debt payments and present value



















10Note that since mortgage contracts typically specify a term by which principal has to
be fully repaid, debt related payments are typically not limited to servicing the interest
bill. In principle, a⁄ordability should therefore account for the existence of repayment
schedules. On the other hand, since a⁄ordability is measured by an index, then one is
interested in changes, not levels. Because the typical duration of mortgages does not
change abruptly over time, accounting for repayment schedules is a minor issue.
14where the second approximation rests on the assumption that the nomi-
nal mortgage rate is an approximately constant spread above the risk-free
rate, i.e. rm = r + s. From (6), it is clear that the lifetime burden of a
debt-￿nanced house purchase depends not only on the current price-income
ratio, but also on the current mortgage interest rate relative to its long-run
level. On average rm
t must be equal to rm, which implies that a permanent
reduction of in￿ ation and nominal interest rates should not a⁄ect the ratio
in (6).
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that the a⁄ordability
index can in no way be taken as a measure of the burden of house ownership,
de￿ned as the amount of resources that a household must sacri￿ce over its
lifetime in order to purchase a house: permanent disin￿ ation and the associ-
ated fall in nominal interest rates, while making housing more a⁄ordable, do
not result in more lifetime resources being available for other types of con-
sumption, but only in a tilting of the debt service burden from early to late
in the lifetime. In the absence of credit constraints, the allocation of lifetime
income to housing versus non-housing consumption should not be a⁄ected
by changing nominal interest rates, so long as real rates are unchanged.
However, it is widely recognized that at least a fraction of households
face credit constraints; for them, borrowing against future incomes may not
be an available option. In this context, household borrowing is below the
desired level.11 Suppose for simplicity that households have access to in￿nite
horizon interest-only mortgages, and that they would optimally choose to
devote a given fraction of their lifetime resources to debt servicing in a
smoothed way. In a high-in￿ ation high-nominal interest rates environment,
the real burden of debt payments would be tilted towards earlier periods,
since on average the rate of increase of nominal income is proportional to the
rate of in￿ ation. Without the possibility of achieving the desired smoothing
of consumption over time, households wishing to issue a given amount of
debt may be discouraged by the need to give up a disproportionately large
share of current and near future consumption. Permanent disin￿ ation would
have the e⁄ect of making that constraint less stringent, inducing households
to issue more debt and raising house prices, at least in the short term when
the supply of housing is ￿xed.12 As documented above, disin￿ ation and
11The literature typically models credit constraints by imposing that a representative
agents￿debt cannot exceed a fraction of his/her housing wealth (e.g. Iacoviello, 2005).
Campbell and Hercovitz (2006) address the issue of constraints deriving from repayment
schedules; they incorporate repayment schedules in an otherwise standard saver-borrower
model by assuming that a declining share of the accumulated housing stock can serve as
collateral, implying that collateralized debt must be repaid according to a predetermined
schedule. Note however that Campbell and Hercovitz￿ s model has no nominal rigidities,
thus it cannot account for the tilt e⁄ect of in￿ ation.
12Nickell (2005) mentions the tilt e⁄ect as a possible cause for the sharp increase in UK
15falling nominal interest rates have characterized the US economy over the
last two decades, possibly allowing credit constrained households to increase
their debt closer to the desired level and pushing up overall housing demand.
What information therefore can be extracted from the a⁄ordability in-
dex? In the presence of credit constrained households, whereby actual debt
is below the unconstrained optimum, an increase in a⁄ordability should be
expected to raise the demand for housing; the associated increase in house
prices should thus be regarded as structural; however, by the same token, an
unexpected increase in actual and expected in￿ ation and in nominal interest
rates would inevitably have a depressive e⁄ect on house prices. How much
of the recent boom in house prices can actually be explained by increased
a⁄ordability is hard to say. On one hand, the answer depends on whether
credit constraints in the US are su¢ ciently pervasive to drive the scenario
depicted above; on the other hand, in recent years interest rates have fallen
both in nominal and real terms, and house prices may have been driven
at least in part by changing real costs of ownership, rather than by the
presumed tilt e⁄ect. The a⁄ordability index therefore provides information
that is di¢ cult to interpret.
3.4 The user cost approach
The literature regards the user cost approach as economically the most sen-
sible to assess the consistency of house prices with fundamentals. The user
cost of ownership, i.e. the sum of the costs that house owners incur every
year net of any o⁄setting bene￿ts, should be equal, on average, to the cor-
responding market rents.13 Denoting by Pt the average house price, by Rt
the associated market rent, and by UCt the average user cost expressed as
a fraction of Pt, the equilibrium condition is:
Rt = Pt ￿ UCt (7)
The inverse of UCt is thus the ratio of house prices to rents consistent
with equilibrium, i.e. 1=UCt = (P=R)
eq
t . By comparing this theoretical
ratio with the actual one it is possible to say whether and to what extent
house prices are misaligned.14 The user cost is computed by combining the
house prices over recent years (see also Debelle, 2004); Brunnermeier and Julliard (2006)
argue that such e⁄ects of changing in￿ ation and nominal interest rates on house prices are
better explained by in￿ ation illusion.
13See Hendershott and Slemrod (1983) and Poterba (1984, 1992); more recently, Him-
melberg et al. (2005).
14Note that house prices and rents, and therefore the ratio between them, are available
as indexes, not values; a meaningful comparison between the actual and theoretical ratios
is possible only if the two (index) ratios can be normalized in a way that informs about the
relationship between the two. A sensible solution is to assume that on average deviations
of the actual price-rent ratio from (P=R)
eq
t , however persistent, are eliminated by market
16costs and the o⁄setting bene￿ts of ownership:
UCt = rm
t (1 ￿ ￿) + w(1 ￿ ￿) + d ￿ (Etgt+1 + Et￿t+1) +   (8)
where rm
t is the long-term nominal mortgage interest rate; ￿ the marginal
tax rate; w the property tax rate; d the rate of depreciation of the property;
(Etgt+1 + Et￿t+1) is the expected capital gain between t and t+1, expressed
as the sum of house real appreciation (Etgt+1) and in￿ ation (Et￿t+1);   a
compensation for the risk of holding real estate assets. The ￿rst term on the
right hand side of (8) is the interest bill on the mortgage necessary to ￿nance
the house purchase, which is implicitly assumed to be fully debt-￿nanced;
if on the other hand it were equity ￿nanced, then one should replace the
mortgage interest rate by a measure of the opportunity cost of money, such
as the long-term Treasury interest rate.15 To the extent that the Treasury
and mortgage interest rates have correlated dynamics, either￿ s choice a⁄ects
the levels of, but not changes in, the user cost. The o⁄setting bene￿ts
of ownership are given by the tax deductibility of mortgage interest costs
(￿rm
t ￿) and of property taxes (￿w￿), and by the expected capital gain,
which is not observed and must therefore be estimated. The last component
of the user cost ( ) is also unobservable, but the assumption that it is
constant implies that it a⁄ects the level of UCt but not its changes;16 if
this assumption did not hold, which is admittedly possible, variations of the
price-rent ratio induced by changes in the risk premium would be wrongly
regarded as non-fundamental movements.17 As far as ￿ is concerned, its
level, even if constant, multiplies the mortgage rate and is therefore not
irrelevant for the dynamics of the user cost. If interest payments were not
tax-deductible, (8) could be rewritten as UCt = rrm
t + w(1 ￿ ￿) + d ￿
Etgt+1 +  , where rrm
t is the real mortgage interest rate (i.e. the di⁄erence
between the nominal rate and expected in￿ ation); in this case, a change in
in￿ ation that is exactly matched by a change in the nominal interest rate
would have no e⁄ect on the user cost, and thus on the equilibrium price-rent
ratio. With tax deductibility, instead, an increase (fall) in in￿ ation lowers
(raises) the user cost, which is the converse of the e⁄ect expected from the
implied change in a⁄ordability, assuming households are credit constrained.
forces that tend to restore the indi⁄erence between renting and owning. Equivalently, the
averages of (P=R)t and (P=R)
eq
t are approximately equal if taken over a su¢ ciently long








t = 100, where T is
the number of available observations.
15Himmelberg et al. (2005) specify the interest costs in terms of the risk-free rate, but
retain the mortgage rate when subtracting the implicit tax bene￿t.
16This also applies to w and d.
17The problem would be more serious if the changes in the risk premium were correlated
with other housing market determinants, rather than being structural breaks determined
by institutional factors.
17An essential ingredient of the user cost approach is the measurement of
expected capital gains. In the literature, di⁄erent methodologies have been
adopted. For example, the expected increase in house prices is proxied by a
moving average of recent past in￿ ation in Poterba (1992) and Girouard et
al. (2006); in a similar fashion, Quigley and Raphael (2004) and the ECB
(2006) use a moving average of recent house price changes. Using a di⁄erent
approach, Himmelberg et al. (2005) measure expected capital gains by long-
term in￿ ation expectations. Since di⁄erent methodologies can lead to quite
di⁄erent dynamics of the user cost, and thus to equally starkly di⁄erent
conclusions about the extent of misalignment of house prices, choosing either
methodology is a critical point that deserves some inspection. An important
drawback with proxies based on moving averages of CPI or house price
in￿ ation is that they are backward looking: there is no reason why high or
low rates of appreciation in the recent past should be expected to persist
far into the future. One may object that it is the expected capital gain
between the current and next period which matters for the user cost, and
that a backward looking proxy works well as a predictor of next period house
appreciation given the high persistence of both CPI and house price in￿ ation.
However, this point does not account for the iterative nature of expectations,
which implies that ￿ in order to be consistent with equilibrium ￿ the
expected capital gain from t to t + 1 cannot be disjointed from what house
prices are expected to do in subsequent periods. Solving (8) forward with











t+j (1 ￿ ￿) + w(1 ￿ ￿) + d +  . Expression (9), just like
(2), resembles the dividend discount formula for stocks, and implies that
the expected change in house prices from t to t + 1 re￿ ects all the future

















Rt+j . In (10), the rate of growth of house prices in the
next period is a weighted average of the expected percentage changes in mar-
ket rents.18 This can conveniently be implemented by setting the expected
capital gain in (8) equal to the sum of the historical average growth of real
18If, in particular, qt+j+1 = q, then
Et(Pt+1)￿Pt
Pt = q, i.e. house prices grow at the same
constant rate as market rents.
18rents (Etgt+1) and the long-term expected rate of CPI in￿ ation (Et￿t+1).
Note that the growth of real rents has been a fairly stable process over the
available sample, although recently real rents appear to have stabilized, in-
terrupting (perhaps only temporarily) a long-run positive trend (see Figure
6); thus, proxying expected house appreciation with the growth of rents in
the recent past would a⁄ect the results in the direction of ￿nding a higher
overvaluation (or lower undervaluation) in recent years.
In addition to the inherent di¢ culties of measuring expectations, another
potentially important caveat of the analysis is the fact that the OFHEO
repeat sales house price index does not control for quality improvements of
the units sold, implying that a signi￿cant portion of the measured long-term
increase in house prices could result from quality additions;19 on the other
hand, quality changes are accounted for by the BLS index of market rents.
A constant quality house price index is available from the US Bureau of
Census, but is calculated for new homes; to the extent that the development
of new property typically occurs at the fringe where the supply of land is
relatively more elastic, the Census house price index has the diametrically
opposite drawback of not properly accounting for the increasing value of
land; in addition, the hedonic methods used to calculate such index have
their own limitations.20
User cost calculations for the US assume the following parameter con-
￿guration: ￿ = 27:5%, w = d =   = 2%.21 In the preferred measure of the
user cost (Model 1), capital gains are proxied, as indicated above, as the
sum of the growth of real rents and long-term in￿ ation expectations.22 For
the sake of comparison with a more naive measure of expectations, Model 2
proxies expected capital gains with the realized CPI in￿ ation over one-year
earlier. Model 3 averages the expectations measured as in Models 1 and
2. The observed price-rent ratios and their theoretical equivalents obtained
from the user cost formula are normalized by the respective 1983-2006Q3
averages (Figure 11).23 An actual price-rent above (below) the equilibrium
ratio can be taken as indication of overvaluation (undervaluation).
19See the discussion in McCarthy and Peach (2004).
20See Hulten (2003).
21Quigley and Raphael (2004) assume ￿ = 30%, w = d = 2%, but include no risk
premium. Himmelberg et al. (2005) assume ￿ = 25%, w =   = 2%, and d = 2:5%. For
the marginal tax rate, I average between their numbers.
22Himmelberg et al. (2005) use this approach to measure the user cost for the US
metropolitan areas (they do not report calculations for the US as a whole). As in their
paper, I use the 10-year ahead CPI in￿ ation expectation series from the Livingston Survey
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
23This is the period of availability of the rent index series.
19Figure 11. Actual versus theoretical house price-rent ratios (1)







































































































































































PR actual PR 1 PR 2 PR 3
(1) Theoretical price-rent ratios PR 1, PR 2 and PR 5 (moving averages of four terms) are implied by the user cost approach, as explained in the text with
reference to Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
The theoretical price-rent ratios exhibit similar dynamics across the three
models, although there are periods during which they can diverge consid-
erably. Between the end-1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, with high
rates of in￿ ation, the theoretical price-rent ratio calculated assuming naive
expectations was much higher than the one calculated with the preferred
methodology, re￿ ecting the smoothness of expected relative to actual in￿ a-
tion. Focusing on Model 1, the theoretical price-rent ratio is much more
erratic than the observed one, alternating periods of apparent overvalua-
tion (the mid-1980s and the latest two years in the sample) to periods of
undervaluation (most of the 1990s). As far as the latest house price boom
is concerned, house prices appear to have been driven by fundamentals be-
tween 1997 and 2003, starting to depart from fundamentals thereafter (Fig-
ure 12);24 by the third quarter of 2006, house prices were overvalued by
almost 30 per cent. Note that the user cost calculated with naive expecta-
tions gives no indication of any misalignment throughout the recent boom;
again, this re￿ ects the fact that long-term in￿ ation expectations have not
increased by as much as current in￿ ation in recent years.
24Figure 12 shows an index of the di⁄erence between the actual and the equilibrium
(Model 1) price-rent ratio. When the two series are equal, i.e. there is equilibrium, the
index is normalized to 100, so that the di⁄erence between the index and 100 gives the
percentage overvaluation (if positive) or undervaluation (if negative) of house prices.















































































































































Difference (actual less theoretical) Real house prices (right scale)
(1) The real house price series is an index with average 1975-2006Q3 = 100; the difference series is based on indexes (actual and equilibrium) with
average 1975-2006Q3 = 100; the equilibrium price-rent ratio refers to Model 1, as explained in the text.
Figure 13 shows the theoretical price-rent ratios calculated by proxying
the expected house appreciation with the three-year moving average of house
price changes (Model 4), which is similar to Quigley and Raphael (2004).
The results for Model 4 show that at times of rapid house appreciation (at
the end of the 1970s and in most recent years) the equilibrium price-rent
ratio increases to implausibly high levels: as a result of robust nominal
house price growth and declining interest rates, the user cost falls to zero
in the ￿rst half of 2005, sending the theoretical ratio up to in￿nity, and
turns negative immediately after.25 When the theoretical price-rent ratio is
derived from the user cost calculated disregarding expected capital (Model
5), its dynamics essentially re￿ ect the decline in nominal and real interest
rates over the last 20-25 years, suggesting an overvaluation in 2006 similar
to that given by the preferred measure (Model 1).
4 Conclusions
Price-income and price-rent ratios are sometimes used to look for evidence
of house price misalignments. By comparing their current values to the
respective historical averages, the price-income ratio suggests that in the
third quarter of 2006 US house prices were 22 per cent too high, while the
25The values of the theoretical price-rent ratio after 2004 are not shown in Figure 13.
21Figure 13. Actual versus theoretical house price-rent ratios (1)
















































































































































































PR actual PR 5 PR 4 (right scale)
(1) Theoretical price-rent ratios PR 4 and PR 5 (moving averages of four terms) are implied by the user cost approach, as explained in the text with
reference to Models 4 and 5, respectively.
price-rent ratio indicates an overvaluation of up to 40 per cent. However,
as is well-known, those measures can be misleading, since none accounts for
changes in the level of interest rates, and the price-income ratio does not
account for the evolution of market rents.
Another commonly used measure of housing market conditions is the af-
fordability index, here de￿ned as the ratio between the interest payments for
a loan necessary to purchase the average-priced house and average income.
In this paper I argue that a⁄ordability indexes provide information that is
di¢ cult to interpret. If households do not face credit constraints, changes in
nominal interest rates that are exactly matched by expected in￿ ation should
not a⁄ect housing demand and prices, while a⁄ecting a⁄ordability measures;
for unchanged real interest rates, higher (lower) nominal interest rates raise
(lower) the burden (in real terms) of purchasing a house early in a lifetime,
but leave the present value of the overall burden unchanged. Therefore,
a⁄ordability cannot be taken as an indication of how ￿ burdensome￿it is to
purchase a house in terms of the resources available to households over their
entire lifetime. If, on the other hand, households face credit constraints, es-
pecially in the form of repayment schedules, then changes in nominal interest
rates can result in a more or less stringent constraint, leading households to
change their indebtedness with e⁄ects on housing demand and prices.
The most sensible approach to assess equilibrium house prices is to calcu-
22late the user cost of ownership, which is equal to the equilibrium price-rent
ratio. Then, by comparing the latter with the observed ratio, one obtains in-
dications about whether house prices are close to equilibrium or misaligned.
Calculations for the United States indicate that periods of overvaluation and
undervaluation have alternated in the last 25-30 years. As far as the latest
boom is concerned, US house price increases between 1997 and 2003 appear
to be justi￿ed by fundamentals, while between 2004 and the third quarter
of 2006 they suggest an accumulated overvaluation of almost 30 per cent.
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